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Is the Chinese Investment- and Export-Led Growth Model
Sustainable? Some Rising Concerns

ABSTRACT
China’s rapid growth and success in poverty reduction over the last three decades has inspired
world-wide admiration. This paper uses a simple framework with a Kaleckian flavor to analyze
structural developments in the Chinese economy, and to understand some of the distributional
consequences. Some of the possible sources of these distributional developments are then further
analyzed using a trade-theoretic approach. Other aspects of China’s investment- and export-led
growth strategy are discussed along with the problems that the focused pursuit of such a strategy
has raised. We conclude that China’s growth model may now have outlived its utility, both on
economic and socio-political grounds.

1.

Introduction and Background

The fact that over the last three decades China has grown at an average annual rate exceeding
nine percent is widely known and admired. Moreover, growth has been accompanied by a sharp
reduction in country-wide poverty numbers. i What is less frequently recognized, however, is that
the trajectory of China’s breakneck growth has created social, political and economic problems
that, if not corrected soon, are likely to impede or even undermine the underpinnings of Chinese
growth in the coming years. This paper discusses some of the constraints on Chinese growth that
are beginning to assume ominous proportions. Our focus mainly is on growing (internal and
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external) constraints and the role that the current investment- and export-led growth model plays
in exacerbating them.
In the years following the Tiananmen Square events in 1989, the Chinese regime carried out an
extensive review of its social and economic policies. ii One of the major changes that the regime
sought to implement as part of a major round of reforms over the period 1992-97 was to attempt
to quicken the pace of economic growth, capital accumulation, and employment creation. A
major policy objective since then has been to rapidly create jobs for the millions of workers of
potential migrants from the rural areas. Perhaps calculating that its internal market was not large
enough to rely on, the Chinese government made well-coordinated efforts to attract exportoriented foreign direct investment (FDI). Figure 1 shows the dramatic increase in FDI in the
early nineties. The figure also shows the evolution of the various components of demand as a
proportion of GDP. Investment and exports have grown dramatically, displacing household
consumption in the process. Government spending, on the other hand, has remained more or less
stable. The contribution of investment to Chinese growth is obvious. However, the contribution
of exports is less so, since total income or GDP is a function of net exports. Not surprisingly,
especially given the vertically integrated nature of Chinese exports (see more on this below),
Chinese imports have also grown rapidly since the beginning of economic reforms. A better
measure of the direct contribution of exports -- a measure that ignores the indirect contribution of
exports via investment) of exports – is, therefore, the trade balance. Figure 2 demonstrates that
the contribution of net external spending has grown significantly in recent years, after a decline in
the mid-nineties. iii
Export-oriented policies require shifting relative prices towards tradables, and within tradables
towards exportables. In pursuit of the former objective, China’s growth strategy has involved
maintaining a ``low’’ real and nominal exchange rate through keeping the renminbi loosely
pegged to the US dollar. iv The second objective, that is shifting production towards exportables,
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has also been pursued methodically. The government has subsidized and favored export-oriented
investment, especially at the local level, partly through the incentives created by the system that
guides promotion of local officials and the tax system, including the production-based value
added tax (Kuijs and Wang, 2005). Beginning in 1992, the government reduced tariffs in a series
of adjustments (see Branstetter and Lardy, 2006). This was followed by the merging of the
official and trading market exchange rates under a regime of managed floating after a big onestep devaluation in 1994.
China’s strategy is reminiscent in many ways of that pursued by the East Asian ``tigers’’ during
their long phases of accelerated growth. However, there are some important differences, both in
the processes and outcomes. For example, South Korea and Taiwan were much less reliant on
external sources of investment. Moreover, expansion of exports in these countries was much less
contingent on the kinds of vertically integrated international production networks that China has
relied on to create an industrialized export base.

The restructuring of the expenditure

composition of GDP was much less dramatic in these countries. As we seek to demonstrate,
these features of the Chinese economy have contributed to entrenching patterns of ``uneven
growth.’’ Finally, China is much larger in an economic sense, which means that its current
growth pattern could have potentially negative effects on the purchasing power of its citizens as
well as those of competing developing countries in the coming years.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.

Section 2 develops a simple Kaleckian

framework to analyze the role of savings in an investment- and export-led growth regime.
Section 3 uses this framework to analyze a few key macroeconomic aspects of the Chinese
growth pattern, focusing on how these combine with microeconomic, trade-related considerations
to facilitate uneven growth in terms of income distribution. Sections 4 and 5 explain how policies
associated with export-led growth can lead to misallocation of scarce resources. Section 6
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extends the discussion to shed some light on ways in which China’s growth trajectory has left it
exposed to developments outside its borders. Section 7 concludes.
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Figure 1: The evolution of expenditures and FDI. C denotes final consumption expenditure, I
denotes gross capital formation, G denotes general government final consumption expenditure,
TB denotes the external balance in goods and services, while X denotes exports. All variables
expressed as percentages of GDP. Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators.

2.

A Key Element: The Decline in Consumption as a
Proportion of GDP

The pursuit of investment and export-led growth based on high (domestic and imported) private
savings often requires constraining the growth of domestic consumption expenditures.

A

frequently used identity illustrates this point. The expenditures approach defines gross national
product (GNP) as:
Y ≡ C + I + G + TB + NFI

(1)
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where Y, C, I, G, TB, and NFI represent income, consumption, government spending, the trade
balance, and net foreign factor income, respectively, all variables being expressed in real terms.
Since the current account (CA) equals net exports of goods and services plus net foreign factor
income,
Y ≡ C + I + G + CA

(1A)

where CA ≡ TB + NFI. But (after-tax) disposable national income can either be saved or
consumed. That is,
Y-T≡C+S

(2)

The latter two identities taken together imply that:
CA = (T – G) + (S – I)

(3)

Put in words, a trade surplus reflects an excess of national (public and private) savings over
investment. v Intuitively, a country running a current account surplus must export savings to the
rest of the world in order for the latter to pay for their CA deficit. Another way to re-arrange
(1A) may provide further perspective:
Y ≡ E + CA

(4)

where E = C + I + G represents domestic absorption or expenditures. Or,
CA ≡ Y - E

(4A)

In other words, a current account surplus reflects an excess of income over expenditures (the
Chinese case in recent years).

Conversely, a current account deficit reflects an excess of

expenditures over income (the US case in recent decades).
In recent years, China has experienced savings and investment rates that are unprecedented even
when compared against the standards set by the neighboring East Asian tigers (Taiwan, South
Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore). Interestingly, true as this is on the investment side, it is even
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truer on the savings side, as reflected recently in growing current account surpluses. Figures 2
and 3 illustrate China’s exceptionally high savings and investment rates. Figure 2 presents trends
in gross fixed capital formation as a proportion of GDP for China and seven other countries or
groups of countries (Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Low and Middle Income
countries, and Middle Income countries). Japan is widely regarded as the first Asian ``tiger’’
while Hong Kong, Korea (Republic of). Singapore and Taiwan are the four East Asian tigers. vi
India is comparable in size and level of development to China, and has, like the latter, been
growing rapidly over the last two decades. Low income countries are defined as countries with
per capita gross national income (GNI) of less than $905, while middle income countries are
defined as those with per capita GNI between $905 and $3,595. As seen in the figure, none of the
other countries or country groups, with the exception of Singapore, has ever attained the levels
experienced by China in the last few years. Figure 3 shows that the savings performance is, if
anything, even more outstanding. Moreover, Chinese saving and investment rates began a steep
upward incline in 2002 which continues to date.
Figure 4 illustrates the issue from a different angle. The trajectories of national investment and
savings change and evolve over time, as does the path of output growth. It makes more sense,
therefore, to compare different economies at comparable phases of their growth trajectories. We
attempt to do this by identifying the fastest growing decades for the relevant countries in terms of
per capita GDP growth. We then average the values of the variables of interest for the decade
and plot them along with the average values of the same variables for China over the most recent
decade. The fastest growing decades were identified as follows: Hong Kong, 1961-70; Japan,
1961-70; India, 1997-2006; Korea, 1982-1991, Singapore, 1965-1974.
Again, the figure clearly highlights the exceptionally skewed nature of the Chinese growth pattern
in the most recent decade. Chinese household consumption has been a lower share of GDP then
even the other East Asian tigers during their rapid growth and accumulation phases.

For
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example, Korea had an average consumption-to-GDP share during their most rapid growth phase
that is 12 percentage points higher than the corresponding Chinese share over the recent decade.
The closest comparison along this dimension is with Japan in its highest growth phase in the
1960s, but even in this case the difference is more than 9 percentage points. China also stands out
in the investment share of GDP, with the closest comparison being with Japan (almost 37 percent
for China versus almost 33 percent for Japan). Similarly, the Chinese savings rate has been
exceptionally high, with the nearest competitor being Japan (with a 6 percentage point
difference). Finally, these differences are also reflected in the trade balance in goods and services
-- which has been positive and exceptionally high for China -- and in the relatively low Chinese
national expenditure share of GDP. The latter statistic underlies the oft-repeated statement that
China has kept its living standards lower than justified by its income level.
The question of what is causing the growing current account surpluses is related to the question of
what facilitates a growth pattern consisting of exceptionally low consumption, high investment,
and even higher savings. This is the question that we turn to next.
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Figure 2: Gross fixed capital formation as a proportion of GDP (1978-2005).
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Figure 3: Gross savings as a proportion of GDP (1978-2005).
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Figure 4: Averaged values of variables (expressed as percentages of GDP) over the fastest growing decade for each country. C_h denotes
household final consumption expenditure, I denotes gross fixed capital formation, G denotes general government final consumption expenditure,
TB denotes the external balance in goods and services, S denotes gross domestic savings, while E denotes gross national expenditure. Source:
World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
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The high Chinese saving rate is frequently attributed to cultural factors, unique to East Asia in
general and China in particular, that are reflected in the higher propensity of households in these
countries to save. While this may undoubtedly be true to some extent, recent research has
rendered this explanation increasingly questionable. Firstly, while the Chinese household saving
rate is high, it is not radically different from that of other developing countries in Asia. For
example, India has had a higher household saving rate in recent years (Kuijs, 2006). Secondly,
Kuijs (2005a) finds that the factor separating China from other high saving developing countries
is the high rate of savings by the government and enterprises. vii Since these enterprises are not
legally obligated or expected to pay out part of their profits in the form of dividends, these are
able to channel retained earnings into fixed investments at high rates. Moreover, Kuijs (2005a)
and Aziz (2007) find that profit margins have expanded in recent years (perhaps partly reflecting
China’s move into sectors that produce more technologically sophisticated products), providing
even more room for the high retained earnings - high investment nexus to come into play. Finally
Kuijs reports that another major reason for high enterprise savings has been the high share of
capital intensive industry in GDP.
This discussion can be linked to broader political economy considerations through Kaleckian
channels. National income can be expressed in yet another way as follows:
Y≡W+R+T

(5)

where W and R denote total (after-tax) national wages and profits. Decomposing domestic
consumption into workers’ and capitalists’ consumption, CW and CR, respectively, allows us to rewrite equation 1(A) as:
Y ≡ CW + CR + I + G + CA

(6)

Or,
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CA = (W – CW) + (R - CR) - I + (T - G)

(6A)

Kalecki assumed that workers do not save. viii Further assuming, for simplicity, a balanced budget
yields:
CA = sR R – I

(7)

where sR denotes the rate of savings out of profit income. It may be more convenient to express
this relationship in terms of GNP. Dividing both sides by Y, defining the share of profit as π, and
using lower case letters to indicate that the current account and investment variables are being
expressed as proportions of GNP yields: ix
ca = sR π – i

(8)

Equation (8) tells us that the higher the share of profits in national income, the higher the
magnitude of national savings and the higher the rate of investment that can be sustained while
maintaining a balanced current account. Alternatively, the higher the share of profits in national
income, the higher the national savings and the higher the current account surplus that can be
sustained at a given proportion of investment.
One of the widely recognized facts about recent Chinese economic history is the shift of income
from wages to profits, as reflected in the national income shares of each group. According to
World Bank (2007), for example, the share of wages in GDP declined from 53 percent in 1998 to
41.4 percent in 2005.

The lower wages have corresponded with a declining trend in the

consumption share of GDP (see Figure 5). In light of equation (8), this feature of the Chinese
growth model has enabled China to rely on external demand and investment to generate high
growth rates while maintaining low consumption and current account surpluses. Noting that
Chinese investment in recent years has been driven mainly by manufactures, real estate, and
infrastructure, Barnett and Brooks (2006) find that manufacturing investment is significantly
correlated with retained earnings. They also find that the capital-output ratio has increased, and
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the marginal product of capital has declined since around 1993. This pattern of increasing
capital-output ratios raises important concerns about the sustainability of recent growth patterns.
For example, based on their estimate that it would require the investment-to-GDP ratio reaching
unprecedented high levels of 55 percent on average in 2014-24 in order to maintain an annual
GDP growth of 8 percent, Kuijs and Wang (2005) conclude that continued investment and
industry-led growth in the scenario on current policies is almost certainly unsustainable.
Furthermore, as discussed in the next section, this growth path has led to the exacerbation of
distributional inequities, which may undermine China’s long-run economic prospects.

Figure 5: The evolution of private consumption and the wage share of GDP. Source: World Bank
(p. 6, 2007)

3.

Uneven growth

3.1

Macroeconomic Aspects

According to Chaudhuri and Ravallion (2006), the unevenness of Chinese growth is characterized
by at least three characteristics:
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•

Unevenness across households, with the incomes of the richest households growing much
faster than those at the bottom of the income distribution, giving rise to dramatically
increased between-household inequality.

•

Unevenness across provinces with the inland provinces lagging behind the coastal
provinces.

•

Unevenness across sectors, with the primary sector (agriculture) lagging behind the
secondary (industrial) and tertiary (service) sectors, and the rural areas lagging behind the
urban areas.

To analyze the unevenness in outcomes across households, it is convenient to look at a related
manifestation of growing polarization, that between the share of profits and wages. As noted
earlier, the national share of wages has been on the decline over the last three decades. We can
again employ some basic accounting identities to guide our discussion. Rearranging equation (6):
Y ≡ (1 - sW) W + (1 - sR) R + I + G + CA

(6B)

Again, assuming for simplicity that workers do not save, (6B) becomes:
Y ≡ W + (1 - sR) R + I + G + CA

(6C)

Thus, due to workers’ higher propensity to consume, an increase in wages has a much greater
proportional impact on aggregate demand from domestic sources than an increase in profits. x
This means that a growth strategy based on domestic demand will be likely to focus on ensuring
that the share of wages in national income does not decline. This provides an interesting contrast
to equations (7) and (8), which imply that a growth strategy based on external demand (as
manifested in current account surpluses) and investment is likely to focus on maintaining or
raising the profit share of national income.
There is another (related) factor that suggests that an outward-oriented strategy would be at best
less focused on, and at worst, opposed to taking direct measures to ensure more egalitarian
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patterns of growth. For an outward-oriented strategy that relies on boosting the competitiveness
of domestically produced tradables, wages that rise at a rate slower than the growth rate of labor
productivity mean falling unit labor costs and hence increased sales (in the case of imperfect
product market competition) and/or higher profit rates. Existing evidence from China suggests
that while wages have been rising rapidly, at least in the urban east coast areas, productivity
growth has been even higher. xi Reliance on external sources of demand has lessened the obvious
economic rationale for reversing this trend. However, the resulting polarization may have serious
socio-economic consequences in the long run, especially if job creation stalls.
Turning to one of the other dimensions along which Chinese growth has been uneven, the eastern
and southeastern coastal provinces have been the greatest beneficiaries of the post-1978 economic
regime. For example, according to Chaudhuri and Ravallion (2006), Chinese provincial rates of
GDP growth ranged from a low of 5.9 percent in Qinghai to a high of 13.3 percent in Zhejiang
between 1978 and 2004. One obvious reason for this polarization between coastal and inland
regions is the heavy public investment in infrastructure that took place in the former due to their
geographical proximity to the dynamic east Asian region (especially Hong Kong), and the
subsequent arrival of domestic and foreign private investment. A related reason is the differential
tax treatment afforded to investors in these areas.

Yet another important factor is the

geographical proximity of these regions to important trade nodes, and their resulting pivotal
position in the existing growth model. A consequence has been, according to an empirical study
by Wan et al. (2007) that uneven distributions of domestic capital, FDI and trade account for
almost 50 percent of total regional inequality.
Finally, following the example of many other developing Asian and Latin American countries,
the Chinese development model has placed a particular emphasis on moving resources from the
rural agricultural sector to the urban secondary and tertiary sectors. xii For example, according to
estimates made by the People’s Bank of China (2004) small and medium-sized enterprises—
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which are significantly more prevalent in services than in industry—account for more than half of
Chinese GDP but receive less than 10 percent of total bank loans. The government’s channeling
of financing to investment in infrastructure has also traditionally been geared towards facilitating
industry in particular (cited by Kuijs and Wang, 2005).
Figure 6 illustrates the relative contraction of the agricultural sector, whose share of value-added
in GDP declined from about 33 percent in the early 1980s to 12 percent in 2005. This shift is also
reflected in the share of total employment in the primary sector which declined from about 70 per
cent in 1980 to about 50 per cent in 1997 (Bhalla and Qiu, 2002). xiii Not surprisingly, while the
rural areas have seen a decline in poverty, their economic growth has been limited relative to the
urban areas.

Moreover, according to Ravallion and Chen (2007), absolute inequality (as

measured by the difference between mean incomes) has increased appreciably, both between and
within both urban and rural areas. xiv In a major study, Kanbur and Zhang (1999) concluded that
the contribution of rural-urban disparities to regional inequality in China exceeded the
contribution of coastal-inland disparities, although the contribution of the latter has grown more
rapidly, especially in the 1990s. xv Wu and Perlof (Table 1, 2005) also find a steady increase in
the urban Gini index starting around 1991 or so. Sicular et al. (Table 1, 2007) find that the
urban–rural income ratio was close to 3 in 2002 and cite Eastwood and Lipton (2004) to
demonstrate that this ratio is quite high by international standards. For example, the ratio for
most other Asian countries lay between 1.3 and 1.8 in the nineties, with the Philippines an outlier
at 2.17.
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3.2

Microeconomic Considerations

A major puzzle in mainstream international trade theory is the simultaneous growth of wagewage and profit-wage inequality in many developed and developing countries in recent years.
Our earlier discussion suggests that there is substantial evidence that this holds true for China as
well.

While the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework of international trade theory does

predict a rise in inequality in capital and skilled labor abundant industrialized countries, it
predicts the opposite for unskilled labor abundant developing countries. The intuition is quite
straightforward.

Given a number of simplifying assumptions, xvi a country’s comparative

advantage in a two good, two country world will lie in producing the good that uses its abundant
factor intensively. In other words, a skilled labor abundant country will find its comparative
advantage to be in the good that uses more skilled labor relative to unskilled labor when
compared to the other good. In the presence of perfectly competitive product and factor markets,
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assuming full employment of all factors, and abstracting away from international factor mobility,
when a country opens up to more trade, the increase in the relative price of its comparative
advantage (export) good leads to a re-allocation of resources towards that sector and a consequent
rise in the relative demand for its abundant factor. The latter, in turn, translates into an increase
in the returns to that factor. Thus, opening up to trade would mean, for a skilled labor abundant
country, an increase in the relative (and absolute) wages of its skilled labor. An unskilled labor
abundant developing country, on the other hand, will see its unskilled labor benefit in relative and
absolute terms. Making the plausible assumption that the owners of capital and highly-skilled
workers will tend to have higher incomes than less-skilled workers, the framework would,
therefore, predict for trade liberalization to result in increased inequality in developed countries
and reduced inequality in developing countries. China, however, has not experienced the trend in
functional distribution predicted by this framework. xvii The reasons underlying this development
are undoubtedly complex and vary with country.

However, we limit ourselves to a few

mechanisms that seem to be directly relevant in China’s case.
China has pursued an aggressive privatization drive since the State Council announced its plans in
1992 to make China a “socialist market economy.” xviii Much of the rapidly expanding private
sector employment in China falls in the informal sector in the sense that it does not enjoy the
labor protections that cover formal sector employees. Add to this the reality that, in the absence
of unemployment insurance, most working age persons in developing countries cannot remain
unemployed for extended periods of time, even if this means working in informal, unregulated
conditions without job security or benefits. Razmi (2009) shows that, in a modified HeckscherOhlin framework that assumes nominal wage stickiness in the formal sector, labor retrenchment
in the public sector will lead to an expansion of the informal sector at the expense of the formal
sector, and growing wage-wage and profit-wage inequality.
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Another feature of China’s investment- and export-led growth model has been its rapid
incorporation into vertically integrated global production networks. Vertical integration, which
has alternatively been termed “slicing the value chain,” “fragmentation,” and “production
sharing”, refers to the geographic separation of activities involved in goods production across
countries.

For example, the production of a good may involve research and design,

manufacturing, assembly of components, and retail. Typically, the first stage is undertaken in
industrialized countries while the labor-intensive assembly stage occurs in labor-abundant
developing countries.

China participates in global supply chains both as a net seller of

intermediate products (for example, firms in East Asia have been importing relatively laborintensive intermediate products from China since the 1980’s) or as an assembler or processor of
final products from manufactured components (for example, special economic zones (SEZs) in
Shanghai have assembled intermediate products into final goods made for U.S. markets since the
1980’s).

Indeed, China has become the global assembling/processing powerhouse, with

estimates placing its processed exports between 45-55 percent of its total exports (see more on
this aspect below).
Feenstra (2001) shows that the trade in inputs between different countries in a vertically
integrated production chain has an effect similar to a skill-biased technical change that increases
demand for skilled labor. The underlying intuition is a nuanced extension of the Heckscher-Ohlin
framework.

The same production processes that are relatively unskilled labor intensive in

industrialized countries may be relatively skilled labor intensive in developing countries. For
example, a manufacturing job that is mechanized in the US, and may therefore, require few skills
to perform in the US may require the skills of a college degree holder in China. Increased
outsourcing of the relatively unskilled labor intensive processes from the US to China as part of
global production fragmentation will, therefore, raise the relative demand for skilled labor in both
countries, generating increased inequality within those nations.
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Razmi (2009) suggests another mechanism driven by the phenomenon of vertical integration. A
significant proportion of vertically integrated export activities in developing countries takes place
in the informal sector. Tariff reductions for imports into a vertically integrated tradable goods
sector make production in that sector more profitable. In the presence of such a sector that is
even more labor-intensive than the formal sector in a developing country, the resulting reallocation of resources can lead to both informalization and growing wage-wage and profit-wage
inequality. We have already provided evidence on growing income polarization in China. The
simultaneous increase in informalization is also becoming well-documented. For example, Ghose
(2008) reports that during 1997-2005, which is a period of growing income polarization,
employment growth in China was entirely accounted for by non-formal and irregular
employment, while formal employment experienced a steep decline. xix The argument that the
simultaneous growth of inequality and informalization in China may share a common causal
factor in the form of heavy reliance on export-led growth raises some intriguing questions for
future research.

4.

Booming investment in non-tradables and real
estate

As mentioned earlier, growth based on expanding trade requires shifting of resources from the
non-tradable goods sector to the tradable goods sector. This in turn is often achieved by raising
the price of tradables relative to non-tradables through maintaining a low (or undervalued)
nominal (and real) exchange rate. As mentioned earlier, this has been one of the motives
underlying China’s rapid accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in recent years. However,
the unsterilized accumulation of reserves has the side effect of increasing the money supply, and
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making available liquidity for investment in sectors outside the tradable goods sector. To see
this, we turn to another commonly used identity:
MB ≡ NDA + Res

(9)

where MB denotes the monetary base (high-powered money), NDA denotes the banking system’s
net domestic assets (held in the form of domestic securities), while Res denotes foreign exchange
reserves (held in the form of foreign currency, assets, securities, etc.). An increase in foreign
exchange reserves thus increases a country’s monetary base. The real estate boom in Shanghai
and other urban areas on the east coast is partly a manifestation of pressures arising from rapid
liquidity growth in China, which is not unconnected to the rapid expansion of the monetary base.
On a related note, another likely consequence of the rapid liquidity creation and accompanying
low interest rates and low cost of capital is the rise in the capital intensity of production. Indeed,
the ICOR ratio of Chinese production has risen steadily in recent years. According to Kuijs and
Wang (2005), more than 90 percent of the growth in industry in 1993-2004 took the form of labor
productivity growth rather than employment growth, mainly led by high investment and increased
capital-labor ratio. As a result, absorption of agricultural surplus labor into the industrial (and
mostly tradable goods) sector has been limited since the mid 1990s. This, in addition to
informalization, at least partly explains the observed decline in the output elasticity of
employment in the last decade. For example, Bhalla and Qiu (2002) citing the People’s Daily
report that while in 1980, one per cent of GDP growth rate led to an increase in employment by
0.33 per cent, during the ninth Five Year Plan period (1996–2000), the figure dropped to 0.16 per
cent. Kuijs and Wang (2005) report that urban employment growth slowed from 5.4 percent per
year during 1978-93 to 2.9 percent during 1993-2004. Considering the immense importance of
generating employment in a labor abundant developing country like China, and the need to
contain social conflict by keeping unemployment and underemployment low, the reduced ability
of investment to create new formal sector jobs becomes a source of concern for policy makers
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and party officials. Moreover, to the extent that slow job growth in the formal sector accelerates
the informalization of the work force, the resulting upward pressure on inequality (see the
previous section) raises further concerns.

5.

Sterilization costs low but could eventually rise

Reverting to equation (9), a country can counter inflationary pressures arising from a rapid
increase in the monetary base by “sterilizing” its reserve transactions. For example, a country
running a balance of payments surplus can sterilize the resulting increase in its monetary base by
conducting open market operations (by selling bonds, for example). In other words, the country’s
central bank can reduce its net domestic assets to offset the increase in foreign exchange reserves.
Existing literature suggests that China has been able to successfully sterilize a major portion (but
not all) of its reserve accumulation. xx A country that sterilizes its foreign exchange accumulation
to prevent it from translating into an increase in the money supply can continue to maintain
competitive exchange rates, and largely avoid the problems created by excess liquidity, at least in
the short run. However, successful sterilization leads to other potential problems. First, by
keeping interest rates relatively high, sterilization creates further pressure for capital inflows and
external imbalances. xxi Secondly, the bonds that the People’s Bank issues in order to sterilize
reserve accumulation raise its interest obligations. For a typical country that accumulates foreign
exchange-denominated assets in the form of US treasury bills, the rise in domestic bond rates as
sterilization proceeds, xxii and the resulting losses to the Central Bank as it issues high interest
bearing securities while earning low interest rates, result in rising “quasi-fiscal” costs of
sterilization. Indications to date, however, are that China has been able to continue issuing
sterilization bonds at low interest rates, thanks in part to the still largely state controlled banking
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system.

However, this is likely to change as China liberalizes its banking system while

continuing to sterilize.
Although central bank operations are usually less than fully transparent, it is estimated that China
holds about 70 per cent of its foreign exchange reserves in the form of dollar denominated assets
(Roubini, 2007). An associated problem that grows in importance as the size of China’s reserves
increases is the potential for large capital losses as the currency eventually appreciates against the
dollar. To put things in perspective, China’s foreign exchange reserves are now estimated to be
approaching 1.8 trillion dollars. Assuming a dollar component of 70 per cent implies
approximately one trillion US dollars.

A 20-30 per cent appreciation of the dollar would

therefore, translate into immediate capital losses to the tune of 360-540 billion dollars, or
significantly more than 10 per cent of Chinese GDP. While a more careful analysis would weigh
this consideration against the possible losses from not holding reserves, this potential (and
growing) cost of reserve accumulation cannot be ignored. Indeed it is the rising actual and
potential financial cost of rapid reserve accumulation that has encouraged China to increasingly
invest in non-government securities, and recently to start a sovereign investment fund in order to
diversify its portfolio of foreign asset holdings. xxiii
Finally, and perhaps most importantly from a longer-run perspective, foreign exchange reserves
(or accumulation of low interest bearing US treasury securities) carry social opportunity costs in
the sense that the resources could be used for more socially productive purposes such as financing
public capital expenditure or paying down external debt and reducing the interest bill.
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6.

The Growing Threat of Protectionism (Man-Made
and Natural)

The trade deficit with China has been the largest bilateral component of the ever-growing US
current account deficit in recent years. The resulting trade tensions between the US and China
have led to some unfortunate China-bashing, especially in the US Congress, where a number of
members have held currency manipulation and “unfair” trade practices such as export subsidies
responsible for the increasing imbalances. For example, in 2005, Senators Charles Schumer and
Lindsey Graham introduced a bill in the Senate calling for the imposition of an across-the board
tariff on Chinese imports in an effort to reduce China's alleged “undervalued” currency
advantage. More recently, the Hunter-Ryan bill (currently under consideration in the House)
calls for treating currency manipulation as a subsidy that can be remedied by WTO-compliant
countervailing duties. Another piece of legislation under consideration, the Davis-English bill,
would grant the US Department of Commerce the explicit authority to apply countervailing duties
to non-market economies, such as China. xxiv It is perhaps useful to recall here that as part of
China’s entry into the WTO in December 2001, other member states retained the right to impose
special escape clause provisions on Chinese exports when producers are under threat of injury
from rapid Chinese penetration of domestic markets. These special provisions came into play
recently in the aftermath of the expiration of the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) on January 1
2005, when the US and EU quickly slapped significant restraints on rapidly accelerating textile
and clothing imports from China. These measures, which are to remain in force until 2008,
highlight the protectionist threat to the Chinese growth model. While the problem is much more
complicated than the proposers of simplistic legislative measures often let on to, xxv the probability
of the Congress legislating protectionist measures to address trade imbalances seems to be
growing by the day.
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While political threats may or may not eventuate, and much in this regard depends on the balance
of political forces, there is another natural source of protection that is becoming ominous by the
day. The dramatic upsurge in international oil prices is likely to act as a major exogenous shock
to the Chinese economy. To understand this, one has to recall that a large proportion of Chinese
export production is based on its location in vertically integrated international production
networks. Thus, according to estimates derived by Koopman et al. (2008), Chinese value-added
constitutes only up to 50 percent of the value of exports. This proportion is even lower for
exports by foreign-owned or foreign-invested firms, and for products such as computers and
telecommunications devices that are considered to be technologically more sophisticated. This
finding -- taken together with the fact that international markets for developing country exports
tend to be quite competitive, reducing individual countries to the role of being price takers -implies that the rise in oil and associated input costs could act as a pincer in China’s case. To
understand how, consider a world with three countries, Mexico, China, and the US. Suppose the
former two export toys to the US. For simplicity, assume that the transportations costs for
Mexican exporters are negligibly small. Next suppose Chinese and Mexican firms sell a toy for
$x in the US. A change in international oil prices raises the cost of importing inputs for the final
assembly of those toys. However, to the extent that China competes with Mexico in the US
market, the Chinese firms cannot raise the final price of their good. Instead, they have to lower
their export price (before transportation) in order to offset the increased transportation costs.
Thus, the oil shock acts as a double whammy, acting adversely on both the input cost and sales
price ends. Of course, Mexican firms would also be hurt by the increased price of imported
inputs, but they wouldn’t be exposed to the shock from the end demand side. Moreover, the same
logic applies even more starkly to competition between domestic US producers and Chinese
exporters. In essence, the oil shock has acted as a real appreciation of the renminbi. If high oil
prices are here to stay, therefore, these present a significant threat to the Chinese growth
model. xxvi
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7.

Concluding Remarks

This paper has explored the sustainability of China’s growth pattern. We discuss the evolution of
the Chinese economy, comparing it to other countries in the region that experienced sustained
episodes of rapid growth, increased investment and savings, and rising exports in the past. Using
a Kaleckian framework, we analyzed some of the macroeconomic aspects of investment- and
export-led growth, both in terms of the changes in the structure of domestic output and
expenditures that facilitate it and the distributional shifts that, in turn, ease the path to those
changes.

We combined this macroeconomic analysis with a look at some trade-related

microeconomic distributional issues, analyzing how developments in recent decades may have
counteracted the benign (equalizing) tendencies that trade theory predicts trade liberalization
would create in a skill and capital scarce developing economy. Our attention then turned to some
of the other pitfalls that have arisen from the kinds of policies such as reserve accumulation,
sterilization, and rapid liquidity creation that have accompanied effective pursuit of export-led
growth. One consequence of these developments has been the rising threat of protectionism
originating from China’s main export destinations.

Another has been much increased

vulnerability to exogenous shocks (such as the recent dramatic increase in oil prices which is,
ironically enough, itself partially a manifestation of rapidly rising Chinese demand for oil) that
noticeably neutralize key elements of China’s growth strategy, leaving it exposed to unforeseen
setbacks. Our main conclusion is that the current growth strategy may have largely outlived its
utility, on both economic and socio-political grounds, and an effective change of course appears
to be highly desirable.
We end by pointing out that while the sustainability of its current growth patterns may be creating
concerns from a narrow Chinese perspective, there exists an even larger issue from the
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perspective of the developing world at large. If a group of countries simultaneously pursue
growth based on expanding exports to industrialized countries, then, in the presence of limited
growth on the demand side, this creates a possible fallacy of composition or adding-up constraint.
Considering China’s exceptionally successful pursuit of an export-based strategy and its large
size, this has implications for countries attempting to emulate China. Given our focus on Chinese
domestic considerations, however, this paper ignores this increasingly important aspect of the
global economy.
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Endnotes
i

For example, Ravallion and Chen (2007) report that in the 20 years after 1981, the proportion of the

population living in poverty fell from 53 per cent to 8 per cent, although half the decline in this percentage
came in the early half of the 1980s. The poverty line used here are an income of 850 yuan per person per
year for rural areas and 1,200 yuan per person per year for urban areas, both in 2002 prices. The aggregate
poverty index is a population-weighted average of the indexes for rural and urban areas.
ii

See, for example, Gittings (2005) for an extensive discussion.

iii

The contribution is expected to have been even higher in 2007.

iv

The US remains China’s largest export market, the share of exports destined for the US having increased

from about 9 percent to 21 percent between and 1984 and 2006. Partly due to the depreciation of the dollar
relative to the euro, however, Chinese exports to the European Union have grown at a much faster pace in
recent years.
v

If we were to define national income in the form of GDP instead of GNP, the corresponding identities will

be:

Y ≡ C + I + G + TB, and TB = (T – G) + (S – I).
vi

The World Bank’s World Development Indicators database does not contain data for Taiwan, which

explains its absence from the figures.
vii

See also Li (2006).

viii

Although this is a somewhat extreme assumption, it captures the empirically observed higher savings

rates out of profit earnings. Assuming positive but lower savings out of wages does not change our
analysis qualitatively.
ix

Notice that this is somewhat different from the typical Kaleckian exposition in which the variables are

expressed as a proportion of the total capital stock instead of national income. Since we do not focus on
issues related to capacity utilization here, our approach is more in line with the objectives of our discussion.
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x

Note that this assumes that investment is relatively independent of savings, and is determined by a host of

factors including investors’ “animal spirits,” expectations of future profits, etc. If we were to take the
classical loanable funds approach, or alternatively, if we were to assume that investment always equals
savings ex-ante, and/or if aggregate demand were very sensitive to investment, then we could have a
regime of “profit-led” growth that depends on high capitalist savings as the major source of domestic
demand. Given the high proportion of investment in China, some may argue that its economy now operates
under a profit-led growth regime rather than a wage-led one.
xi

See Figure 5. See also Kim and Kuijs (2007).

xii

Although, as noted elsewhere in this section, the movement of labor in recent years has been more

towards services than manufacturing. The primary sector usually consists of agriculture, forestry, and
mining, the secondary sector consists of manufacturing and construction, while the tertiary sector consists
of retail trade, financial services, utility provision, and other categories of services.
xiii

This number further declined to 44 per cent in 2002, according to the World Bank’s World Development

Indicators Online.
xiv

According to their estimates, since growth in the primary sector (primarily agriculture) did more to

reduce poverty and inequality in China than either the secondary or tertiary sectors, starting in 1981 if the
same aggregate growth rate had been balanced across sectors, it would have taken 10 years to bring the
poverty rate down to 8%, rather than 20 years.
xv

They attribute the latter observation to the still existent prohibitions on inter-provincial movement of

labor in China. See also Yang (1999).
xvi

The reader is referred to any standard international trade textbook for a list of these assumptions.

xvii

This also happens to be true for a number of other developing countries. See Goldberg and Pavcnik

(2007) for a comprehensive survey.
xviii
xix

See Overman (1995) for an overview of China’s privatization plans.

Indeed, in spite of all the hype over China’s booming manufactured exports, Banister (2005) finds that

manufacturing employment actually declined between 1995 and 2002. At least some of this is likely to be
due to increased informal employment which does not show up in official statistics.
xx

See, for example, Ouyang et al. (2007).
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xxi

Note that China has run both a current account and a capital account surplus in recent years. This of

course, is offset by the official reserve transactions of the People’s Bank.
xxii

As the Chinese central bank sells bonds to neutralize the effects of reserve accumulation on the

monetary base, this increases the relative supply of Chinese bonds on the market, and should have the
effect of raising the interest rate on Chinese offerings. This `portfolio balance’’ effect, although hard t o
empirically detect, seems to be present when developing countries offer sterilization bonds on the market.
Since much of the banking system in China is still under state control, however, the sale of sterilization
bonds appears to have had negligible effects on interest rates.
xxiii

Indeed, Premier Wen Jiabao recently highlighted this concern when he told a business audience in

Singapore that ``we are worried about how to preserve the value of our reserves,” and that “we have never
been experiencing such big pressure.” (Dickie et al., 2007).
xxiv

The US Department of Commerce has had a long-standing practice of not applying countervailing

duties on products exported from so-called “non-market economies” on the grounds that it is not possible to
accurately evaluate the free market price of goods exported by such economies. The duty imposed on
Chinese glossy paper in early 2007 was a major departure in this regard.
xxv

For example, the imposition of tariffs on Chinese exports, or the successful culmination of efforts to get

the Chinese to revalue their currency – a revaluation acts simultaneously as an import tariff and an export
subsidy – is likely to displace exports from China to other cheap labor countries such as Vietnam.
xxvi

Indeed, in a story for the Wall Street Journal, Aeppel (2008) reports that a number of companies are

already moving production and purchases back to the US. DESA LLC, for example, reported that the 15%
increase in the cost of shipping goods from China contributed to its decision to produce more in Kentucky.
Also, see Rubin and Tal (2008) for an interesting analysis of the China, Mexico, and US case.
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